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Organization Development is a managerial discipline which
has been incorporated by all the military services in the
United States of America. This thesis examines the need and
potential to bring Organization Development into the Korea
Air Force in the near future. After explaining what
Organization Development is, and how it is used in the U. S.
military, Korea's environment, its cultural traits, and the
Air Force's particularities are brought into discussion. The
view is taken that OD is needed and viable in th'e Korea Air
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents an approach for achieving
organizational goals within the Republic of Korea Air Force.
The underlying body of knowledge to support this approach
will be based upon the concepts and techniques of
Organization Development (OD)
.
The authors attempt to show that Organization Development
is needed and viable in the Korea Air Force and also that the
usage of certain OD approaches and techniques will help the
Korea Air Force improve its effectiveness.
A. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Organization Development will be defined as a long-range
effort to improve organizational effectiveness, using the
theories and techniques of behavioral science, action
research and other related areas. Later, a more formal
discussion of the definition of OD will be presented. It is
premised that before any attempt is made to apply OD
approaches to the Korea Air Force, these approaches should be
subject to a careful modification process to make them more
compatible with the culture, environment, and the
characteristics of Korea.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Before any attempt is made to find out the potential of
applying OD in the Korea Air Force, it is necessary, first of
all, to understand what OD is. Some knowledge about how it
is used in other military services will be helpful as well.
Then, the need for OD and its viability in the Korea Air
Force should be examined. Finally, more specific





The world around us is changing at an increasing speed
and the competition is getting severe. Just to survive
today's society/ people and organizations should try to adapt
and change in a positive manner. As an approach to dealing
with organizational change, Organization Development (OD) has
been widely used inside as well as outside the military in
the United States over the last ten years.
The U.S. Army, for example, with strong top management
support, is utilizing about 400 OD consultants. Through
understanding and participation in OD, the Army reports that
it saved more than $85 million in the one year period from
March 79 to March 80.
The U.S. Navy has approximately 700 people involved full
time in OD. Almost all Navy operational units have now
received Human Resource Management (HRM) interventions.
These standardized OD interventions are mandatory once every
18-24 months for the fleet.
The U.S. Air Force has several centralized consulting
groups that travel world-wide to Air Force installations




Most of the civilian companies have separate OD
departments and some of them, like GM, FORD, IBM, and XEROX
have even vice presidents for OD.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide readers with
some information about OD answering the questions:
(1) What is OD?
(2) what are the characteristics of OD?
(3) What conditions call for OD?
(4) What are the assumptions and values of OD?
(5) what is the process of a typical OD effort?
B. WHAT IS ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT?
In attempting to answer the question: What is
Organization Development, a variety of concepts have been
expressed by leading experts in OD:
Richard Beckhard defines it as:
An effort (1) planned, (2) organization-wide, and (3)
managed from the top, to (4) increase organization
effectiveness and health through (5) planned interventions
in the organization's "processes," using behavioral-science
knowledge
.
Warner Burke defines it as:
Organization development is a process of change in an
organization's culture through the utilization of
behavioral science technology, research and theory. More
specifically, for an intervention in an organization to be
OD, it must (1) respond to a felt need on the part of the
client, (2) involve directly and collaboratively the client
in the planning and implementing of the intervention, and
(3) lead to change in the organization's culture.
11

Robert Golembiewski defines it as:
In intent, OD constitutes a value-loaded, theory-based set
of interventions that seek a simultaneous, multiple pay-
off: meeting individual and group needs, while contributing
to the long-run efficiency and effectiveness of large
systems.
Larry Greiner defines it as:
A process of intervention in an organization to influence
its long term development through a: (a) focus on
behavioral processes, (b) emphasis on a broad range of
humanistic values, (c) concern for coping ability in
solving problems and exploring opportunities for growth.
Edgar Schein defines it as:
OD is all the activities engaged in by managers, employees,
and helpers which are directed toward building and
maintaining the health of the organization as a total
system. OD is for the total organization what group
building and maintenance is for small groups. How it is
done, by whom, and by what means will vary. What defines
it is the GOAL of a healthy organization. OD should NOT be
associated with what consultants and helpers do. A healthy
organization can develop itself; its managers are the
primary practitioners of OD. But just as healthy
individuals or groups need help in maintaining their
health, so organizations need help in maintaining their
system health, and such help can come from internal or
external consultants. OD experts should therefore be
experts at helping. They should NOT get caught up with any
particular technique such as survey feedback, team
building, etc., but should stay focused on how to help
[Ref. 1].
Wendell French and Cecil Bell Jr. define it as:
Organization development is a long-range effort to improve
an organization's problem-solving and renewal processes,
particularly through a more effective and collaborative
management of organization culture—with special emphasis
on the culture of formal work teams—with the assistance of
a change agent, or catalyst, and the use of the theory and
technology of applied behavioral science, including action
research [Ref, 2: p. 14],
12

In general/ Organization Development can be seen as a
long-term attempt to bring about greater level of personal
and interpersonal effectiveness (with special emphasis on the
work group) in an organization. In most cases, some sort of
outside consultant (or change agent) participates in the
initial phase of the change process.
The long-run goal of OD is to help the organization learn
to change itself, without outside help, in response to new
problems and difficulties it encounters.
There is an emphasis on the "long-range" effort. OD is
more than a one-shot intervention. The main target of the
effort is usually interpersonal relationships and communica-
tions. There is a distinct humanistic flavor to OD. The way
to increase the organizational effectiveness is through the
work-team climate. The use of a change agent is part of the
process. Both the content and the process of intervening are
important for determining what constitutes an OD effort.
C. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OD
The general characteristics of an OD approach can be
summarized as follows [Ref. 3: pp. 15-16]:
(1) There is a planned program involving the whole
system.
(2) The top of the organization is aware of and
committed to the program and to the management of it. This
does not necessarily mean that they participate exactly the
same way as other levels of the organization do, but that
they accept the responsibility for the management.
13

(3) It is related to the organization's mission. The
organization development effort is not a program to improve
effectiveness in the abstract. Rather it is an effort to
improve effectiveness aimed specifically at creating
organization conditions that will improve the
organization's ability to achieve its mission goals.
(4) It is a long-term effort. It may take two or three
years for any large organization change to take effect and
be maintained. This is one of the major problems in
organization development efforts, because most reward
systems are based on rewarding the achievement of short-
term "profit" objectives. Most organization leaders are
impatient with improvement efforts which take extended
time. Yet, if real change is to occur and be maintained,
there must be a commitment to an extended time, and a
willingness to reward for the process of movement toward
goals, as well as toward the specific achievement of short-
term goals.
(5) Activities are action-oriented. The types of
interventions and activities in which organization members
participate are aimed at changing something after the
activity. In this respect, OD activities are different
from many other training efforts where the activity itself,
such as a training course or a management workshop, is
designed to produce increased knowledge, skill, or
understanding, which the individual is then supposed to
transfer to the operating situation. In OD efforts, the
group builds in connections and follow-up activities that
are aimed toward action programs.
(6) It focuses on changing attitudes and/or behavior.
Although processes, procedures, ways of work, etc., do
undergo change in organization development programs, the
major target of change is the attitude, behavior, and
performance of people in the organization.
(7) It usually relies on some form of experienced-based
learning activities. The reason for this is that, if a
goal is to change attitudes and/or behavior, a particular
type of learning situation is required for such change to
occur. One does not learn to play golf or drive a car by
getting increased knowledge about how to play golf or drive
a car. Nor can one change one's managerial style or
strategy through receiving input of new knowledge alone.
It is necessary to examine present behavior, experiment
with alternatives, and begin to practice modified ways, if
change is to occur.
14

(8) OD efforts work primarily with groups. An
underlying assumption is that groups and teams are the
basic units of organization to be changed or modified as
one moves toward organization health and effectiveness.
Individual learning and personal change do occur in OD
programs but as a fallout these are not the primary goals
or intentions
.
D. CONDITIONS OF OD
An essential condition of any effective change program is
that somebody in a strategic position really feels the need
for change. Richard Beckhard lists the kinds of conditions
or felt needs that call for OD efforts as follows [Ref.3:
pp. 16-19]
:
(1) The need to change a managerial strategy . It is a
fact that many managers of small and large enterprises are
today re-examining the basic strategies by which the orga-
nization is operating. They are attempting to modify their
total managerial strategy including the communica'tions
patterns, location of decision-making, the reward system,
etc
.
(2) The need to make the organization climate more
consistent with both individual needs and the changing
needs of the environment . If a top manager, or strategi-
cally placed staff person, or enough people in the middle
of the hierarchy, really feel this need, the organization
is in a "ready state" for some planned-change effort to
meet it.
(3) The need to change "cultural" norms . More and more
managers are learning that they are really managing a
"culture" with its own values, ground rules, norms, and
power structure. If there is a felt need that the culture
needs to be changed, in order to be more consistent with
competitive demands or the environment, this is another
condition where an organization development program is
appropriate.
(4) The need to change structure and roles . An aware-
ness by key management that "we're just not properly
organized," that the work of (let's say) the research
department and the work of the development department
15

should be separated or should be integrated; that the
management-services function and the personnel function
should report to the same vice-president; or that the field
managers should take over some of the activities of the
headquarters staff, etc. The felt need here and the
problem anticipated in effecting a major structural or role
change may lead to an organization development effort.
(5) The need to improve intergroup collaboration . One
of the major expenditures of dysfunctional energy in orga-
nizations is the large amount of inappropriate competition
between groups. When this becomes noticeable and top mana-
gers are "hurting," they are ready to initiate efforts to
develop a program for increasing intergroup collaboration.
(6) The need to open up the comm unications system.
When managers become aware of significant gap in
communication up or down, or of a lack of adequate
information for making decisions, they may feel the need
for action to improve the situation.
(7) The need for better planning . One of the major
corollaries of the increasing complexity of business and
the changing demands of the environment is that the
planning function, which used to be highly centralized in
the president's or national director's office, now must be
done by a number of people throughout the organization.
Most people who are in roles requiring this skill have
little formal training in it. Therefore, their planning
practices are frequently crude, unsophisticated, and not
too effective. An awareness of this condition by
management may well lead to an organization-wide effort to
improve planning and goal-setting.
(8) The need for coping w ith problems of m erger . In
today's world, it is more and more common for companies to
merge, for divisions of organizations to merge, for church
organizations to merge, for subgroups doing similar tasks
to merge. In every merger situation, there is the
surviving partner and the merged partner. The human
problems concerned with such a process are tremendous and
may be very destructive to organization health. Awareness
of this, and/or a feeling of hurting as the results of a
recent merger, may well cause a management to induce a
planned program for coping with the problem.
(9) Need for change in motivation of the work force .
This could be an "umbrella" statement, but here it
specially refers to situations which are becoming more and
16

more frequent where there is a need for changing the
"psychological ownership" condition within the work force.
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES OF OD
An OD observer views things through his own perceptual
filters. Most behaviors are not directly observable so he
has to depend upon perceotions. Therefore, it is important
to know what kind of values the observer has and what kind of
assumptions he makes when OD change agents come to work.
Richard Beckhard made an extensive listing of assumptions
consistent with other experts as follows [Ref.4].
1. Assumptions about Individuals
(1) Most individuals wish to grow and develop.
(2) Most individuals want their organization to
succeed.
(3) Most individuals tend to be resistant to change
particularly if goals or means toward them are unclear.
(4) Most individuals need reference groups in an
organization.
(5) The peer group usually is a primary reference
group.
(6) Individuals tend to support change more if they
have participated in planning change.
(7) Individuals can learn to improve their diagnostic
skills to better analyze a situation and plan its change.
(8) Most individuals in hierarchical organizations have
learned to resist, avoid, or suppress confrontation and
management of conflict.
(9) Individuals have membership in several groups
(i.e., subordinate, head of a work family, colleague group,
etc.). Therefore effective work performance requires
effective leadership and membership skills.
17

2. Assumptions about Organization Systems
(1) The larger organization system is composed of a
series of overlapping work groups connected by linking
pins. The basic unit of change in an organization is
usually a face-to-face group.
(2) Any change in a sub-system is likely to affect the
whole system.
(3) A particular aspect of a system (i.e., morale,
quality of communication, etc.) is in a quasi-stationary
equilibrium held there by opposing forces.
(4) Most hierarchical organizations have norms of
relatively low openess due to a low level of trust.
(5) Most organizations have norms of suppressing,
avoiding, or compromising conflict within work groups and
between groups.
3. Assumptions about Change Efforts
(1) Every change effort involves changed attitudes.
Attitudes must be unfrozen, new ones learned, and
refreezing achieved.
(2) A basic change is to create conditions where
those affected by the change can systematically and
meaningfully plan it and carry it out.
(3) Work families or peer groups make natural learning
groups
.
(4) Relationships, interpersonal communications, and
values are matters on which working groups should spend
some work time.
(5) A universal target of change is to help people
diagnose their own acts and learn from them.
(6) Any organization change effort must have goals
that are meaningful to those who will be affected by the
change.
(7) To change a sub-system, relevant aspects of the
environment must also be changed. Examples: (a)
Supervisor's attitudes toward subordinates' learning at a




(8) The place to begin a change effort is where
stress or strain or an identified problem exists— not
necessarily at some arbitrary point in the hierarchy.
(9) If basic structural changes are contemplated,
change should start at the policy-making level.
(1G) Both the formal and informal organizations should
be considered.
(11) Systematic information collection, feedback, and
action planning by the system to be changed, closely
related in time, helps the implementation of change
efforts.
(12) Change of norms toward more openess is an early
priority.
(13) Norm changes in the early stagesof an "improve-
ment program" can usually best be accomplished through an
"objective mediator" or catalyst. He provides support so
that individuals are more likely to take some interpersonal
risks.
4. Assumptions about Change Agents
(1) A personal relationship of trust and mutual
confidence must be established with each "client" as early
as possible.
(2) He must deal with the dependency relationship
usually existing in a helping relationship.
(3) He must concentrate on diagnosis of the problem
and avoid the temptation of early solutions.
(4) He must control his own needs to control the
situation or the client.
(5) He must avoid defending, advising, premature
persuation, and over-controlling.
(6) The change agent must build in plans for stabi-
lizing and maintaining change without undue dependence on
him.
5. Values and Belief Systems of Change Agent
(1) Behavioral scientist-change agents tend to place a
value on optimism. It is a kind of optimism that people
19

can do a better job of goal setting and facing up to and
solving problems, not an optimism that says the number of
problems is diminishing.
(2) They believe work and life can become richer and
more meaningful, and organized effort more effective and
enjoyable, if feelings and sentiments are permitted to be a
more legitimate part of the culture of organizations.
(3) They tend to commit broadly to both action and
research, which can include inquiry and examination into
the nature of change processes and the effectiveness of
interventions.
(4) Presumably they place value on democratization of
organizations or on "power equalization" [Ref. 2: p. 35].
F. PROCESS OF A TYPICAL OD ACTIVITY
There have been many attempts to design a multi-stage
model based on an organization development approach to
consultation. The Kolb-Frohman model is a model that
incorporates the major points of those attempts [Ref. 5:
pp. 51-65].
The model focuses on two central issues which are highly
interrelated. One concerns the relationship between client
and consultant, and the other concerns the nature of the
work. It is typically the second issue that receives the
most attention from consultants even though relationship
factors also strongly affect the course and outcome of
consulting work. These two issues can be considered within
the framework of a dynamic, seven-stage model of the planned
change process: scouting, entry, diagnosis, planning, action,










Figure 1 : Kolb-Frohman Model
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These stages are by no means clear-cut in practice. They
may occur sequentially or simultaneously. However, the
articulation of each stage provides a convenient way for the
consultant to conceptualize and recognize the stages in his
practice.
In the figure, the arrows connecting the stages
illustrate the general developmental nature of the model.
The first feedback loop, from planning to entry, defines the
need for renegotiation with the client in light of diagnosis
and planning activities. The second loop, from evaluation to
planning, defines the need for using the evaluations of
previous actions to modify planning activities.
1. Scouting
Neither the client nor the consultant himself has
committed to working with the other. Each is free to explore
the potential relationship in order to obtain some
preliminary data about the other. The client system is
searching for resources and solutions to its problems. An
invitation to a consultant to work with the client is based
on the client's perception that the consultant can help in
some way. The consultant is also scouting his own interests,
values, and priorities in order to decide whether this client
system is one with which he wants to work. Usually the first
question to answer is "what about their perception of the
problem and myself that led them to contact me?" The most
22

important result of this scouting phase is the choice of a
formal entry point in the client system. It is important to
identify the power structure of the client system, so the
change might be established by those that accept it and have
enough power to influence its achievements.
2. Entry
Once the entry point has been selected, the
consultant and the client system, through the entry
representative, begin to negotiate a contract. The use of
the term "contract" by Kolb and Frohman is "to define if and
how the succeeding stages of the planned change process will
be carried out." They went on and listed ten areas in which
agreement should be reached. Here, they pose a heavy
emphasis on the importance of trust-based power, which they
define as "the informal influence that flows from
collaborative problem definition and solution." Hence, to
create and reinforce trust-based power is necessary to
establish a collaboration relationship between the client and
the consultant.
As the planned change process progresses and new
information is gathered, it may be necessary to renegotiate
the contract. That's because the nature of the problem may
change in light of the change (s) that had already taken place
and the consultant's particular expertise may become more or
23

less relevant to the client system. After setting these
details out, the process moves to the next step.
3. Diagnosis
This phase focuses on four key elements: the client's
felt problem, the client's goal, the client's resources, and
the consultant's resources. The start of diagnosis with the
client's "felt problem" does not mean to copy his words. It
involves appreciating the client system's culture and
language, being in his shoes to see the problems the way he
sees them. This empathy is fundamental to insure the
client's involvement in the diagnostic process. Also
important is to identify the subpart(s) of the system where
the problem is located and the interrelationships of those
subpart(s) with the rest of the system. This is necessary to
be able to anticipate the effect of the change in one part of
the system on the other components. The next step is to
define the client's goals; To what state is the client
striving? The sources aspect of client and consultant,
especially the motivation and readiness for change is
important in improving the client system. Is the client
system really committed to the solution of the problem? Are
the key individuals responsible for implementing the change
committed? What are the consultant's motives
—
prestige,
genuine desire to help, scientific experimentation?
24

The consultant uses several methods to obtain the
diagnostic information: interviews, surveys, and
observations, etc. Another aspect to watch carefully is the
client system's response to the consultant; Is he seen as a
threat or a helper?
4. Planning
This phase should proceed in close cooperation with
the client to insure that the plans are appropriate to his
needs and that he will understand them and be committed to
their execution. The specific behavioral objectives to be
achieved by the change should be set at this stage. This
will make the evaluation easier. Then alternative solutions
or change strategies can be generated with each classifying
the source of power used to implement and the organizational
subsystem to which the intervention is addressed. Kolb and
Frohman define six subsystems to be considered as follows:
The people subsystem - manpower and education.
The authority subsystem - formal and informal.
The information subsystem - formal and informal.
The task subsystem - satisfaction and technology.
The policy/culture subsystem - norms and values.
The environment subsystem - internal and external.
5. Action
The best change strategy developed is implemented in
this phase. The better the previous phases, the smoother
25

will be this phase. The problems found in this phase can
usually be traced back to unresolved issues in the early
phases. Most of the failure is due to the unanticipated
consequences of the change effort.
6. Evaluation
This phase can be done either by the same consultant
or by a different consultant hired for this effort. The
evaluation is conducted in terms of the specific objectives
defined during the planning phase as well as interim task
goals designed to determine if the change is progressing as
desired.
7. Termination
By definition, the consultant-client relationship is
temporary. So the termination conditions should have been
clearly defined and agreed upon at the initial entry
contract. There are two different termination situations;
success and failure. Achievement of the goals outlined in
the ENTRY-DIAGNOSIS-PLANNING phase and improvement of the
client system's ability to solve the similar problem in the
future are the two aspects of the success.
Failure, of course, is a very embarrassing situation





In an attempt to provide the reader with the basic idea
of OD, this chapter has covered a wide array of materials,
all of which represent a strong techno-structural foundation
for the thesis. As discussed above, Organization Development
is a long-range effort to increase organizational
effectiveness utilizing, in most cases, some sort of outside
consultant. OD uses theories and techniques from several
disciplines including behavioral science, action research and
other related disciplines.
OD effort involves planned changes related to the
organization's mission. It focuses on changing attitudes
and/or behavior, and usually relies on experienced-based
learning activities. The felt need and commitment of the top
managers are necessary.
With this basic information about OD, the next chapter
will examine how OD is used in the U.S. military.
27

III. U.S. MILITARY OP PROGRAM
As a useful start in exploring whether OD in the Korea
Air Force might be initiated, it is helpful to study other
military OD programs. By 1978 the U.S. military had over
1,000 people engaged in full-time organization development
(OD) consulting. The U.S. military OD has succeeded widely
and is becoming fully institutionalized [Ref. 6: p. 198],
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contrasting
U.S. military OD programs: Organizational Effectiveness of
the Army; Human Resource Management of the Navy; and
Leadership and Management Consultaion of the Air Force.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE U.S. ARMY
1. Background
In the 1960's several individual commanders
experimented with behavioral science and management
technology as the Army experienced societal problems and
changes (e.g. racial unrest, dissent, drug and alcohol abuse,
general disrespect for traditional values and institutions,
and on top of these the end of the draft) and became aware of
serious shortfalls in leadership and management practices
[Ref. 7] [Ref. 8].
Their experiments were brought to the attention of
senior leaders; and in 1972, the Chief of Staff of the Army,
General 3. Rogers, directed that a series of experiments be
28

conducted. Projects included job enrichment, human relations
training, assessment centers, survey feedback, and OD.
Those experiments terminated in June 1975, with a decision to
adopt OD and to train selected military personnel as
consultants to be used within the Army.
In July 1975, the Organi z t ional Effectiveness
Training Center (OETC) was established at Fort Ord,
California. A 16-week course was developed and tested, and
the first regular course started in January 1976. Interest
in the use of OE methods and trained personnel began to
spread, and top level seminars and briefings were conducted
all around the major Army commands.
The Chief of Staff of the Army remarked on the
subject of OE at the Army Commanders' Conference and formed
an OE Study Group [Ref. 9], The use of OE methods has spread
rapidly, and are in active use in most major commands
[Ref. 10].
2. Me thodolog i e s
Organizational Effectiveness operations are conducted
using the four-step process of assessment, planning,
implementation, and evaluation/follow-up [Ref. 11]. The
assessment phase includes observations, interviews (both
individual and group), various instruments (most notably the
29

General Organizational Ques tionair e) , and analyses of
historical documents pertaining to the organization.
Although these are typical assessment designs, no set
design is required. The expectations, limitations, and
techniques for the operation are mutually contracted between
the commander and the consultant.
The planning phase occurs once the assessment data
has been reduced and fed back to the commander. This is a
joint effort between the commander and consultant, with all
decisions for implementation made by the commander. This
phase is extremely critical to the success of the overall
intervention.
Implementation follows the planning phase. Typical
implementations might include workshop and various consulting
services tailored to meet the need of the organization.
These services are normally provided in the work environment.
The OE operation is evaluated and, if necessary,
followed up some months after the conclusion of the
implementation. A seperate formal evaluation stap is often
not reached because the consultant provides continuous
feedback and evaluation data to the commander throughout the
operation.
It should be emphasized that the commander has the





Organizational Effectiveness consultants had been
almost all officers, in grades 0-3 and 0-4, with a few 0-5s
until 1979, when two piolt courses for NCOs graduated 97
students. Officers selected to attend the 16-week training
course at the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center
and School (OECS) located at Fort Ord, California, from all
occupational specialties, must: be 0-3 or above; be a college
graduate, preferably with a major in behavioral or management
science; have troop experience; be a graduate of an officer
advanced course; be retainable in the Army for 24 months on
completion of training [Ref. 12: p. 2-1].
They are taught process consultation, team building,
survey feedback, conflict resolution, group problem solving,
and other similar OD techniques. Over 500 officers had been
trained by 1978. After the approval of the Department of the
Army, NCOs are now trained in the same class as officers.
Upon successful completion of the training,
consultants are assigned in pairs to major Army units and
installations. The consultant can expect to work in that
capacity for approximately 1-1/2 to 3 years, at which time
the officer is usually assigned to a branch-related duty.
For a significant percentage of OE consultants their branch
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reentry assignment is one which often maximizes use of 0E-
related skills. Repetitive consulting tours of duty are
possible.
4. Characteristics
Organizational Effectiveness is managed by commanders
at a variety of levels throughout the Army who are authorized
the capability of providing OE consulting within their
organizations. However, the actual use of the consultant by
subordinate elements of the organization is voluntary, with
OE operations strictly between the commander and the
consultant.
Since consultants are permanently assigned to a
specific installation, they are an integral part of the
organization. This has its benefits and drawbacks. Being
part of the organization probably means the consultant has
more long-term ownership in the OD effort and is more readily
available if problems arise. And the commander has the
opportunity to test the compatibility of personality styles
and values of the consultant with those of himself and staff
before committing the unit and the consultant to the use of
time and personnel resources. However, the consultant is
subject to the reward and control systems of the





The Array's Organizational Effectiveness program has
been enjoying the support of the top management from the
beginning [Ref. 9] [Ref. 13]. This strong support is based
primarily on anecdotal reports from OE clients that can be
found in every OE communique [Ref. 14].
One recent report concludes that the OE process in
the U.S. Army is cost effective, saying that with an
estimated activity level of 3,743 OE operations during the
period March 1979 to March 1980, the returns to the Army from
allocating resources to OE were more than $85 million
[Ref. 10].
B. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. NAVY
1. Background
The United States Navy took its first tentative steps
in establishing a Human Resource Management Program in
January 1971 as it felt the need for improvement. Admiral E.
Zurawalt, Chief of Naval Operations, began a one-year pilot
program with a cadre of twenty-four active duty Navy
personnel to "develop and evaluate new ideas and techniques
in the human relations area" [Ref. 15: p. 4]. By the end of
1971 a full-scale planned change was outlined by the project
members as the desired approach for implementing the
Organization Development Program into the Naval environment.
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The overall design was a synthesis of existing strategies in
Organization Development and was labled Command Development.
After a series of pilot projects, the Navy decided in
early 1973 to institutionalize the OD process. They changed
the name into Human Resource Mangement (HRM) and established
five human resource management centers with detachments
throughout the world. The cultural clash that occured during
the pilot test (early consultants wore civilian clothes and
were perceived to be outsiders by their clients) convinced
the Navy the importance of the credibility of the
consultants. Therefore, the centers and detachments are
staffed with experienced line officers and senior NCOs with
outstanding records and recent operational experience.
2. Methodologies
The Navy's approach is based heavily on survey-guided
development [Ref. 16] and follows nine steps: (1) initial
visit; (2) data gathering; (3) data analysis/diagnosis;
(4) feedback; (5) Human Resource Availability (HRAV)
Planning; (6) HRAV; (7) unit action; (8) follow-on
activities; (9) follow-up visit [Ref. 17].
Data gathering is accomplished primarily, but not
exclusively, by administering the Human Resource Mangement
Survey. The major OD-related dimensions covered by the
survey are (1) command climate (communications flow, decision
making, motivation, and human resource emphasis), (2)
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supervisory leadership (support, team coordination, team
emphasis, goal emphasis, and work facilitation), (3) work
group process (coordination, readiness, discipline), and (4)
outcome measures (satisfaction, integration of meeting
individual and organizational goals, and lower-level
influence)
.
Results of the survey are analyzed, summarized, and
fed back to the client. Data interpretations, client's felt
needs, and consultant perceptions lead to formulation of the
remaining activities of the cycle.
As a result of the survey feedback, the commanding
officer (CO) often decides to have intact groups or a
vertical slice (people from all organizational levels) of the
ship or unit attend a one- to three-day human-resource
workshop that uses a standardized series of lectures, films,
and exercises on such topics as motivation, communications,
MBO, leadership, and race relations. A workshop to develop a
command-level human-resources action plan often follows the
human-resources workshop. The plan is then implemented.
The operation is normally conducted during a unit's
scheduled five-day human resource availability period at a
regional consulting center or detachment for selected




Unless the OD effort is terminated because of
operational commitments, an evaluation will usually be
conducted with the client organization approximately eight to
ten months after the five-day availability period. A second
survey may be administered at this time to identify changes.
Additionally, the client may request and contract for further
consulting services, or terminate the operation at his
discretion.
The Navy's HRM program is mandatory and quite
standardized. Although participation in the HRM program,
taking the survey, and preparation of a Command Human
Resource Mangement Action Plan are required, all the other
steps in the process are optional. That is, the CO could
decline to participate by not taking all the optional
workshops and planning sessions.
3. Personnel
There are approximately 700 people involved full time
in active consultant, administrative, and support position
including a small percentage of civilians [Ref. 6: p. 193].
Of these about 500 are consultants, with 300 enlisted E-5 to
E-9, 164 officers from Ensign to Captain, and 50 civilians
[Ref. 19: p. 17]. They are products of a formal 12-week
Human Resource Management School located at Memphis,
Tennessee. The school provides basic instruction in both
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organization development and content and process areas as
well as Navy program specifics.
The tour of duty as a consultant is for 2-3 year
period followed by a reassignment to regular fleet duty in
their warfare or occupational specialty. The source of
consultants is via the routine personnel assignment process
although individuals may voluntarily request this type of
duty. Successful consultants are given an organizational
coding to indicate their expertise. This coding increases
the possibility of a reassignment to human resource
management work at a subsequent point in their Navy careers.
4. Chracteristics
Although Human Resource Management is mandatory and
quite standardized, there is more flexibility than first
appears: as each Human Resource Mangement center and
detachment works as a relatively autonomous consulting
center, it can tailor its interventions to the needs and
readiness of its clients or to its own preferences; as the CO
is only required to take some phases of the process, he can
effectively decline to participate any further.
5. Results
The Navy Human Resource Mangement Efforts has now
reached system-wide proportions. Enjoying the support of top
management, it has currently involved 100 percent of the
Navy's first line operational units [Ref. 18: P. 76].
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Most COs who have participated in HRM are positive
toward it. One recent estimate made by the consultants is 75
percent. Others do not like the survey, think the survey is
irrelevant, or the process too time consuming. The COs who
encounter HRM for the second time appear to be much more
favorable toward it; they now understand the process and can
zero in on problems they are interested in [Ref. 6: P. 193],
One experimental comparison of a sample of 60 units
(30 experimental and 30 controls) from the Pacific Fleet
found that participation in the HRM process may have short-
term effects on retention of younger personnel (it improved
5.8 percent during the six-month period in which HRM
occured) , but that the effects may not last (after the six-
months or more the improved re-enlistment, rates were not
sustained) [Ref. 20].
Another study compared 103 (experimental) ships that
had participated in HRM with 103 matched (control) ships that
had not. It appears that the experimental ships had
significantly higher scores for overall readiness and
equipment readiness than did the control ships [Ref. 21].
C. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTATION IN THE U.S. AIR
FORCE
1. Background
In mid-1975, the United States Air Force Management
Improvement Group examined many nontechnical aspects of Air
38

Force life and work. They administered a 150-itera
questionaire to more than 58,000 (approximately 11 percent)
randomly selected Air Force members to determine attitudes
associated with a variety of quality of life issues.
The analysis of the data revealed one area that
caused particularly high concern: 81 precent responded good
leadership and supervision was highly important; but 72
percent rated the quality of Air Force leadership average to
poor (41 percent rated it average, 31 percent below average
or poor, and 26 percent excellent or above average). This
finding coupled with other more extensive data relating to
this perception, suggested to the group to recommend that an
organization be created to revitalize leadership and
management training for Air Force supervisors.
General D. Jones, the Air Force Chief of Staff,
directed, based upon this recommendation, to establish the
Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC) in the
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He further
specified that management consultation field teams be formed
to travel to Air Force organizations world-wide to (1)
conduct leadership and management education seminars for
supervisory personnel at all levels within the host
organizations, and (2) provide management consultation
service to the host commanders and their subordinate
commanders, managers and supervisors.
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In December 1975 the first LMDC consultation team was
formed and began its education-consultation efforts from the
next year. The leadership seminars with consulting
activities to broad but simple leadership problems were the
focus of the early team efforts. In response to the growing
demand for LMDC services, three ten-member teams were formed
in October 1976 and began visiting world-wide [Ref. 22].
2. Methodologies
Participation in the Air Force's Management
Consulting program is voluntary. Requests for assistance are
usually initiated by wing commanders and most consulting
activities are conducted at the wing level. Upon receipt of
a consulting request, the LMDC dispatches a 4 or 5 person
consulting team to the requesting organization as quickly as
possible. This team is responsible for data collection, the
first step of the management consultation process which
includes (1) data collection, (2) analysis, (3) feedback,
(4) management action plan, and (5) follow-up.
Data collection is done by (1) administering the 109-
question Organizational Assessment Package (OAP) to all
identified work groups within the client organization, (2)
administering a Supervisory Assessment Package to supervisors
in the client unit whenever appropriate, (3) interviewing
supervisors and key peopele at all organizational levels, and
(4) collecting other relevant data.
40

Once the data are collected, they are taken to the
LMDC for computer processing. The data are incorporated
into a management consultation data base which has
accumulated more than 100,000 cases, with the client
organization receiving computer printouts that include
normative data, demographic data, and tests for statistical
significance
.
In about four to six weeks, when the diagnostic
results are available, a larger team (8 to 10 people) returns
to client organization to feed back assessment results and
implement interventions tailored to the organization.
A management action planning is then conducted, and
specific intervention strategies are identified for future
implementation. The visiting consulting team usually works
in the client system for two to three weeks. Commonly
employed at this time are interventions for all work groups
and a full range of workshop and seminars.
A post-organizational assessment is conducted 4-6
months after the completion of previously planned
interventions. The resulting data are then used to evaluate
the effectiveness of the intervention and may be used in
planning subsequent follow-up activities [Ref. 23].
3. Personnel
LMDC consultants (mostly Captains, Majors, Lieutenant
Colonels and senior NCOs) are selected based on outstanding
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performance in their functional area. Most have had
extensive formal training and education, and each has brought
with him or her many years of experience in one or more of
the many Air Force functional career fields. Selection is
accomplished by means of special application, personal
interview, and recommendations.
Consultant training begins with a formal five-week
training course at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. They
begin with some background theories necessary for consulting
work. Then they learn Organization Development for
theoretical and experimental introductions to entry,
contracting, data gathering, diagnosis, feedback,
intervention and evaluation. Case study follows to serve
students as a consulting practicura. Following the five-week
course, students must complete the Academic Instructor Course
or equivalent. Finally, the student consultant must prepare
for and make two complete consulting visits as part of a
supervised consulting internship before being certified as a
consultant. The entire process is a very demanding six to
nine months of training. Currently there are around 40
consultants in LMDC[Ref. 22],
4. Characteristics
Air Force consultants are geographically centralized
at the LMDC and are thus physically far removed from the
client's chain-of -command. So every client has to make a
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request through formal channels for consultants' assistance,
which might be viewed as suggesting that the implied need has
in fact been verified and that some commitment has been made
to use the team when they arrive. The client may not have
the opportunity to test the compatibility of personality
styles and the values of the consultants with theirs.
The needs and norms of the user command will not
necessarily be viewed from the most appropriate point of view
as the consultants are not organic members of that command.
After the consulting team leaves the user unit, the loosening
of user-consultant ties reduces likelihood of meaningful
sustainment of positive changes initiated during the
operation. Also, time constraints imposed by a prearranged
schedule might dictate use of less than optimal
implementation strategies and reduce tactical flexibility.
As the LMDC programs utilize a small number of
central experts (1) the program is relatively cheap,
(2) installation manpower expenses may be minimized, (3) good
quality experts become available to every part of the
service, (4) high level of quality control over the experts
is possible, (5) experts become very experienced in the
process, and (6) base line information becomes avilable to




During the one year period from January 1976 to March
1977, LMDC Consultation Teams visited 76 installations in the
Continental United States, Alaska, Europe and the Pacific.
More than 56,600 Air Force supervisors have attended the
1,123 on-site seminars conducted during this period. The
increasing number of invitations indicate that the LMDC
approach is working. Almost every Air Force installation has
requested LMDC managerial consultation services and several
bases have already made their requests for second visits.
Testimonials are constantly being received which cite
improved morale, increased satisfaction, greater commitment,
and improved interpersonal and intergroup relations— all
essential ingredients contributing to the bottom
line— increased combat readiness and production effectiveness
[Ref. 22].
D . SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed and analyzed the organization
development (OD) efforts in the United States military. The
Army uses a voluntary, decentralized approach with strong top
management support, participation, and understanding. The
Navy relies heavily on a standardized and centralized survey-
feedback model using mandatory participation. The Air Force
has a few consultants consisting of several central groups
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that travel to widespread and considerably smaller
installations.
With over 1,000 people involved full time in OD, the
U.S. military probably has the largest OD program in
existence. This fact alone can be an indirect measure of the
success of the military OD program even though the perception
of success is based largely on anecdotal reports,
testimonials, and personal involvement of the decision
makers.
The wide-spread usage and its claimed success in the U.S.
military are enough to encourage further work. The next two
chapters will examine the contextual enviroment of Korea and
more specific considerations for the Korea Air Force as




IV. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF KOREA
A. ENVIRONMENT
Korea is a peninsula thrusting from the northeast Asian
mainland in a southerly direction. In the adjacent
geographic area are three of the world's four most powerful
nations, the People's Republic of China (PRC) , the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Japan. A fourth
power, the United States of America is deeply involved in
defense and other activities of the Republic of Korea.
Due to the vagaries of international politics Korea was
divided into two rival regimes in 1948 and within two years
of its founding had to experience the Korean War in which
seventeen nations from around the globe participated as
belligerants.
Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, the
north Koreans violated the terms of the agreement on more
than 40,000 occasions on land and sea and in the air: the
Pueblo incident (1968) ; the Chung Wa Dae Commando incident
(1968); the shooting down of U.S. reconnaissance plane EC-121
(1969); the infiltration tunnels in the DMZ discovered in
1974, 1975 and 1978; the brutal ax-murders at Panmunjom
(1976); the shooting down of an unarmed U.S.
helicopter (1976) ; promulgation of the so-called Coastal
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Defense Zone along with a 200-mile fisheries protection zone
(1977); frequent infiltration of spy boats, and the violation
of the territorial air space over the five islands off the
west coast.
Even now, despite the South's superior economy and large
population, the North enjoys a formidable advantage in
military power and persists in its aggressive policy toward
the South.
This continuing challenge to national survival has
inevitably conditioned the Republic of Korea's policy
response: great emphasis on national security. Internally,
this has meant a political system best suited to a maximum
mobilization of national efforts for deterrence. Externally,
the persisting security threat has called for a maximum
foreign policy effort to mobilize international support for
the Republic of Korea's defense effort, in particular,
diplomatic effort to persuade the U.S. to maintain a
sufficiently credible military presence in Korea.
To reduce and ultimately terminate such dependence, the
Korean people have been making a determined effort to achieve
the goal of a self-reliant defense. Since the launching of
the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, the
Korean economy has maintained an 3.8 percent annual growth
rate to 1980, raising the per capita GNP from U.S. $87 to
U.S. $1,503 [Ref. 24]. The Five-Year ROK Forces
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Modernization Program developed in 1975 based on ROK Forces
Improvement Plan financed primarily by the fiscal source of
the national defense tax was aimed at securing a defense
capability to repel north Korean aggression provided it is
unaided by China or Russia.
The Homeland Reserve Forces, created in 1958, have
positively engaged in the defense of the homeland as well as
propelling the Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement). The
Combat Reserve Corps, created in 1975 and equipped with
modern heavy firearms and communication equipment such as
those provided for the regular army, is designed to counter
the infiltration in the rear area by north Korea's specially
trained task forces. The Student's National Defense Corps,
organized in 1975, receives some military training and does
other cooperative activities including participation in the
Saemaul-Undong during peace time, while effectively
shouldering the responsibility of maintaining order in the
rear areas, and defending their respective areas of
responsibility in time of war.
The Civil Defense Corps units, organized in every
community in the land beginning in 1975, are charged with the
responsibility of protecting the lives and property of people
in times of enemy attack or other situations affecting the
public peace and order. The Civil Air Raid Defense Training,
begun in 1972, is devoted to countering atomic, biological,
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and chemical warfare engaging the Civil Defense Corps, in
relaying messages, sheltering people at important
installations, rescue operations, and fire-fighting.
The defense industry which began to develop in the early
60s, has improved in capacity and capability to a
considerable level as to be able to manufacture 500MD light-
armed helicopters, Cobra heavy-armed helicopters, 106mm
recoilless guns, amphibious armored vehicles of Korean
design, Vulcan anti-aircraft guns, 4.2-inch mortars, 105mm
and 155mm howitzers [Ref. 25].
Further, South Korea has developed long and medium-range
ground-to-ground missiles of its own. The developed missiles
were successfully test-fired on September 26, 1978 at a west
coast missile range, marking a milestone in the nation's
efforts to achieve self-reliant defense capabilities. Shown
in the test-firing were anti-tank missiles and multi-loaded
rockets which were also produced with local technology.
President Park, Chung-hee said in his new year news
conference on January 18, 1978, that "the nation has begun
full-fledged mass production of air-to-air and ground-to-
ground missiles and radar." By 1981, the supply of such
highly sophisticated weapons will totally meet the needs of
Korean armed forces. He also said that thanks to defense
donations and funds from the National Defense Tax, most basic
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weapons, now owned by Korean armed forces, are locally
produced.
He disclosed, by inspecting the manufacturing of
remodeled tanks in a certain industrial complex and watching
the testing of those home-made tanks, that South Korea has
begun the mass-production of M48 tanks of remodeled A3 and A5
types which are equivalent to the up-to-date U.S. M60A1
[Ref. 26].
South Korea has also successfully completed the
demonstration flight of the home-made F-5F, a supersonic jet
fighter, on September 9, 1982 [Ref. 27].
B. SAEMAUL-UNDONG (NEW COMMUNITY MOVEMENT)
1. Introduction
As the decade of the 70s unfolded, the cities in
Korea were moving ahead at a dizzying pace, as a result of
the successful implementation of two five-year economic
development plans (1962-1971) , while the countryside was
still sunk in lethargy, passivity and even cynicism. Rural
people were straggling behind their urban brethren.
Something had to be done to correct this situation. The
farmers had to be awakened.
The Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement) was
proposed in 1970 and set in motion in 1971 with the urge that
the farmers must be awakened, and that the benefits of
dilligence, self-help and cooperation must be brought home to
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them. Ever since, the movement has become a major factor in
rural development. In fact, within the short span of four
years, the rural communities had developed so rapidly that in
1974, the per capita income of the farmers began to exceed
that of the city workers.
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader
with an insight to the Saemaul-Undong and to facilitate the




A formal and wide spread movement for rural
development started in 1961 in the name of National
Reconstruction Movement. Under the Central Headquarters,
provincial, county, township, and village committees were
organized nation-wide in a short period. Active support from
the government administrative machinery was required and
therefore it become a sort of top-down process. In the
meantime, two five-year economic developments (1962-1971)
which emphasized industrial development and expansion of
exports were successfully implemented resulting in an 104.2
percent increase in gross national product with average
growth rate of 9.7 percent per annum. But, the National
Reconstruction Movement, which was primarily a rural-based
movement, did not receive the needed financial,
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administrative and political support from the government,
although it was retained until 1973.
Growth in the agricultural sector lagged far behind
that in the industrial sector. Accordingly, the gap between
annual incomes of farm household and city workers widened.
The deteriorating rural situation became a major cause for
the rapid shift of the rural population into the large
cities. In the 1950s the farming population constituted
about 70 percent of the total population but it decreased to
46 percent in 1971.
The rapid shift in the population created many
9
problems in the rural areas, such as serious labor shortages
where mechanization was not yet known. The quality of the
remaining labor force deteriorated, since mostly the elderly
and women remained on the farms. Most of the villages were
left without potential leaders since those who departed were
relatively well-educated young men.
In light of this situation, the Third Five-Year
Economic Development Plan (1972-1976) emphasized a balanced
growth between industry and agriculture. During the period,
the government planned to invest $2 billion in agricultural
development. In order to maximize efficiency of the
investment, the agricultural sector, especially the farmers,
had to be ready to make effective use of such investment.
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Traditionally, Korean rural society has been family
or clan-oriented, stagnant, pre-modern, and isolated. There
was much cooperative spirit shown in family affairs, such as
funerals, marriages, and other social matters, but the rural
people lacked training in cooperation on a rational basis in
their main activity, farming. Another factor related to the
necessity for training in cooperation is amalgamation of
agricultural cooperative societies. The primary
agricultural cooperative societies that were organized at the
village level were not suitable for the introduction of
modern agricultural techniques, making effective use of
credit, water, and other agricultural production inputs, or
for improving marketing efficiency.
In this situation, some sort of nation-wide impetus
became necessary to cultivate positive attitudes in the rural
masses, to assist them in gaining confidence in the future,
and to nurture a spirit of self-reliance and cooperation.
There was a need for a nation-wide mass movement strongly
supported and spearheaded by enlightened, dedicated,
efficient administrative machinery [Ref. 25].
3. Basic Philosophy
The basic conceptual foundation of the Saemaul-Undong
is to help rural (and urban) people develop the virtues of
dilligence, self-help and cooperation. It is a national
modernization movement based on cultivating in the people's
53

mind a spontaneous urge for national development by
identifying it with self-betterment.
Everybody must work hard and acquire the habit of
dilligence and of a thrifty daily life. Trying to be rich
without working hard is anathema to national development.
The spirit of dilligence must result both from and in an
assured bright future. Thus voluntarily-inspired hard work
is an important ingredient of the Saemaul spirit. Voluntary
effort is bound to be accompanied by creative initiative,
which means the desire and ability to make something new.
The Saemaul-Undong is also designed to inculcate a
spirit of self-help among the people. This spirit
originates in one's sense of independence. Those who
possess this spirit do not lean on others, nor do they shift
their responsibilities to others, but they perform by
themselves what should be done. Since the Saemaul-Undong
also aims at bringing prosperity to those villagers who work
for themselves, it naturally helps cultivate their awareness
of communal, and eventually, national identity. In a more
general sense, it encourages national self reliance,
obviating dependence on financial assistance from foreign
countries.
The Saemaul-Undong represents the Korean people's
desire and effort to create a society in which each and every
member is entitled to help community in the satisfaction of
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his human needs. In order that such a society may be
created, all villagers are urged to participate in various
community projects such as improvement of village roads,
construction of bridges, and strengthening of embarkments.
Cooperation leads to solidarity. When villagers see what
they have achieved by mutual cooperation, they feel firmly
united.
The three basic components of the Saemaul spirit,
i.e., dilligence, self-help, and cooperation, are inseperably
related to each other. It is necessary, therefore, that the
movement harmonize the three ingredients in the course of
implementation.
The element of the practical approach to the Saemaul-
Undong may be divided into three categories, i.e., spiritual
enlightenment, social development and economic development.
First, the Saemaul-Undong is a movement to cultivate
dilligence, self-reliance, and cooperation and then to put
these concepts into practice. The movement is intended to
teach the people the fact that individual as well as national
well-being depend on the morale and voluntary initiative of
the people, and therefore a progressive, productive and
pioneering spirit is the basis for national and individual
development. Second, the Saemaul-Undong is social
development designed to create welfare in which both the
rural and urban people can enjoy a cultured and harmonious
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social life. Third, it is an economic development movement
aimed at increasing productivity and income of the people,
particularly the farmers, and thus assuring a universal and
sustained high standard of living [Ref. 25].
4. Progress and Achievement
In the initial stage of the movement, main emphasis
had been placed on environmental improvement. Increasing
rural income has become one of the most important policy
objectives of the movement since 1973. More recently, the
movement has developed into a broad social movement by
spreading to the urban sector.
To be charged with the overall planning and
coordination of all related activities, The Saemaul-Undong
Central Consultative Council was organized in 1972 under the
chairmanship of the Minister of Home Affairs with the vice-
ministers of all the concerned ministeries and agencies as
members. Similar organizations were established at each
successive level, i.e., province, county, township and
village.
A Saemaul Leaders 1 Training Institute was opened in
1972 for training village Saemaul leaders developed among the
villagers.
As it became a nation-wide movement, special Saemaul
Divisions were created in several ministers, all provincial
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governments and in county offices. And the "Saemaul Order of
Merit" was added for distinguished leaders of the movement.
Efforts were made gradually to transform the movement
from a government-led drive to a popular one. For this
purpose/ Saemaul consultative councils were organized in
private institutions in all provinces and cities,
particularly to promote the urban Saemaul-Undong.
Urban Saemaul leaders, social leaders (from business,
universities, religious circles, the labor movements, news
media, etc.), and high-ranking government officials were
included in the training of the Saemaul Leaders [Ref. 25].
A great deal of government and private investments
and efforts have so far been poured into various projects
dedicated to the improvement of village environment and
construction of an agricultural infrastructure. As a result,
3,164 kilometers of village roads have been repaired and
widened and 43,631 kilometers of farm feeder roads newly
opened. A total of 9,915 reservoirs or 99 percent of the
project target of reservoir construction were built and 4,402
kilometers of irrigation canals or 109 percent of the
projected target newly dug, transforming nearly 90 percent of
the nation's paddy fields into all-weather rice paddies.
In the fields of culture and environment, 2,740,000
rural housing units or 99 percent of the total have been
provided with electricity, making it possible for farmers and
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fishermen to enjoy modern amenities such as television. A
total of 2,450,000 thatched-roof housing units have been
replaced with tile and slate roofs. 34,123 units of multi-
purpose warehouses constructed. Another outstanding
achievement of the Saemaul-Undong has been remarkable
increases in rural income. Per capita farm household income
went up by 5.6 times in 1977 to 1,433,000 won from 256,000
won in 1970[Ref. 26].
5. Saemaul-Undong in Urban Area
The Saemaul-Undong which originally started in rural
areas as a campaign to develop stagnant and poverty stricken
farming areas, has spread to every corner of the country.
The movement is now in full swing in urban areas as well.
City dwellers have actively joined in campaigns for street
cleaning and beautif ication as part of the urban Saemaul-
Undong .
Since 1974 the Movement has spread to private
enterprises and plants with emphasis given to quality
management, cost reduction, labor and management cooperation
and improvement of the welfare of employees. Employees are
to adopt a sincere and serious attitude toward their duties,
which will enable them to increase productivity, and as a
consequence to increase profits to the employer, who will




The Movement in the urban sector also emphasizes
improvement of the environment, promotion of sound morals and
the establishment of a social order. Campaigns against
traffic law violation, the utterance of vulgar words,
spitting on the streets and improper manners have been waged
as part of the broad urban Saemaul-Undong.
The government is guiding the Movement to become a
force generating a momentum for the reinforcement of
discipline in all the aspect of national life [Ref. 26].
6. Impact of Saemaul-Undong
The most important influence of the Saemaul-Undong is
its impact on the morale of the people. It has helped
create a cooperative spirit among the people, which is the
basis-for any rural development activity, and enabled the
people to form a bright and positive outlook on the future.
At the same time, confidence among the people ("We too can
make it") has been nurtured.
The people practiced how to participate and
cooperate. For any Saemaul project, voluntary and active
participation of the villager is the basic requirement. All
the villagers are requested to participate in the discussion
for project selection, in sharing the costs of the
investment, and in contributing labor for the project.
Without all villagers' consent and participation, it is
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impossible, for example, to make a road through a village or
passing through many paddy fields.
The other important aspect of the Saemaul-Undong is
development of rural leadership. To make the implementation
effective, they needed leaders developed from among the
villagers. Two leaders (one of each sex) are elected by the
villagers, sent to the Saemaul Leaders' Training Institute
for one or two weeks training, and assigned responsibilities
for planning and implementing Saemaul projects for the
villages. In 1978, more than 24,000 leaders were trained.
In Korea, the Saemaul-Undong is now becoming the
training vehicle for the entire people to solve their own
problems. Everything is done on the basis of Saemaul spirit.
After five years of the movement, the initiative was
gradually turned over to the people. More and more villages
are initiating the bottom up process, which is possible only
when a vigorous cooperative spirit is at work among the
people.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed Korea's geopolitical situation,
threat from the north, and its defense efforts including its
economic development, and the defense industry. It also
covered the Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement).
Korea needs OD. This becomes clear when we see the
situation of Korea in light of the conditions that call for
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OD activities: the threat from the North, the defense efforts
with limited resources, and the need to improve effectiveness
and efficiency.
Saemaul-Undong was originally begun to fulfill the gap
between the industrial and agricultural sector, thus to
promote national integrity. In its progress, it enlightened
the people, changed their attitudes, and provided them with
opportunities of participating, discussing and cooperating to
achieve goals. It also trained a lot of leaders. All these
facts provide a fertile ground for OD to live.
The next chapter will examine specifics of the Korea Air




V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR STARTING OP IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE
Assumptions about the way things are and what is
worthwhile or correct vary widely from culture to culture.
Thus, it is necessary to discuss cultural differences that do
not allow the effort to apply OD into Korean environment
directly as it is presented in the Western literature. This
chapter will focus on the cultural considerations in applying
OD in Korea and the specific environment of the Korea Air
Force. Then, discussions of factors both helping and
impeding the application of OD in the Korea Air Force will be
followed.
A. CULTURAL CONSIDERATION
Religion and values are inextricably entwined in Korean
social structure. Of these, Confucianism has had by far the
longest and most intense influence on the ideas and values of
Korean people since the 14th centry [Ref. 28: p. 102].
Buddhism had grown to be a tremendous economic and political
power in the long centuries of its predominance; in order to
crush that power once and for all, the rules of the Yi
dynasty (1392-1910) adopted Confucianism as the central and
orthodox tradition. Confucianism was thus deliberately
introduced as an instrument to supress 3uddhism influence in
Korean society. This policy succeeded and Confucianism came
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to predominate in the intellectual and spiritual life of
Korea.
Now Confucious and his diciples are no longer revered as
sages in Korea except among a small number of people. Most
Koreans may not even be aware that many of their fundamental
ideas and values are derived from Confucian teachings.
Nonetheless, these ideas and values, now taken simply as "the
way things are," can be understood only with reference to
their roots in this tradition [Ref. 29].
It is expressed clearly in the very first line of a
primer used during the Yi dynasty: "Of all creatures between
Heaven and Earth, man alone is that he possesses the Five
Relationships." The Five Relationships are that (1) between
father and son there should be affection, (2) between ruler
and minister there should be obligation, (3) between husband
and wife there should be proper distinction, (4) between
elder and younger there should be proper order, (5) between
friends there should be faithfulness. This doctrine of the
Five Relationships is the cornerstone of all Confucian moral
and social teaching. What it teaches is that there is a
distinctively human level or manner of relating to others,
and only by learning to relate on that level does one act in
a way worhty of a human being. When this uniquely human
quality is lacking in relationships, human beings sink into a
subhuman level of behavior. This human quality is that one
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does not seek one's own ease/ convenience, or profit; that
is, one does not act in a self-centered, self-interested way
which is viewed in Confucian tradition as the primary root of
evil and disorder.
The Confucian approach, which emphasizes human
interrelatedness and reflects upon what is required to relate
to others, leads to a different set of values, such as
reverence for others, harmony, proper order in society, and a
keen awareness of what others do for one and what one should
do in return. From this perspective, the limitations of the
individualistic values are more apparent than their
excellence: they seem to be qualities which center the
individual in himself and cut him off from others, leading to
pride, irreverence, and insensitivity to others.
Closely connected with this emphasis on reverence is the
traditional Korean fondness for YEUI, the rule of proper and
polite behavior. Confucians held YEUI in high regard, both
because its practice inculcated that sense of self-discipline
and restraint which was regarded as the foundation of all
sound character formation, and because it provided the forms
of proper, dignified, and harmonious social interaction.
In Confucian society, age was one of the primary
yardsticks of hierarchy as is reflected in the third of Five
Relationships. That is, the elder should always have
precedence over the younger. So ambitious young man must
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bide his time and wait his turn rather than openly and
aggressively challenge the view of his elders.
Three of the Five Relationships—father-son, husband-
wife, and elder-younger (brothers)—directly refer to the
family. Further, the relationship of ruler and minister was
often paralleled with the father-son relationship. Thus the
family stood at the center of everything.
Everyone outside the family is potentially someone to be
treated with caution and a bit of suspicion. The family unit
is the area of true security. In the inner confines of the
family one can relax and find trust, love, comfort,
obedience, and gaiety. The father is traditionally the
respected and unquestioned head of the family, and he rules
with almost absolute power if he so desires. He has full
responsibility to feed the family, to find work for the
members, to approve all moves, marriages, and future life of
the younger members of the family [Ref.30: p. 32].
In Confucian thought, filial piety provided the
groundwork for all the other virtues, and its practice
touched on every aspect of life. In its most limited sense
filial piety involved reverence for one's parents and a
selfless devotion to their well-being. But in fact it went
far beyond this as "One's body is the body of one's parents
passed onto oneself. While one's parents are alive, one may
not venture to consider his person his own, not consider his
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possessions his own." The practice of filial piety was not
restricted to family members. It also applied to the duties
and responsibilities of society whenever they found
themselves in a superior-inferior relationship.
Proper relationships are all-important in Korea. And
most relationships are not between equals or peers but are
between unequals. In this vertical society, strict protocol
requires that all social superiors be treated with great
respect, regardless of personal feelings toward them.
So it is important that one's "face" or reputation be
preserved in many cases. This inevitably places much
emphasis on preserving the good feelings of others. Because
of this emphasis on feelings and appearance, it is often more
important that things appear well than that they actually be
well. When something displeases them, they try to make their
feelings known indirectly in a way that will not injure the
relationship they cherish. Circumlocution is usually an
effective means.
B. KOREA AIR FORCE
The Korea Air Force personnel represents about 5 percent
of the country's total Armed Forces. The other branches of
the Armed Forces of the country are the Army, and the Navy in
which the Marine Corps is included.
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Principal components of the Air Force are the Combat Air
Command, the Air Logistic Command, and the Aviation training
Command
.
The Air Force is composed of 15 fighter-bomber squadrons,
1 fighter reconnaissance squadron, 3 tactical transportation
squadrons, 1 search and rescue squadron and some others. It
has 378 combat aircraft with Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-
air missiles and Maverick air-to-ground missiles. But North
Korea has 51,000 personnel (6.4 percent of its total Armed
Forces), and 700 combat aircraft in its Air Force [Ref. 31:
pp. 82-84].
To bridge this gap, more than 100 state-of-the-art U.S.
jet fighters are stationed on five Korean airfields, with at
least another 100 in Japan and with B-52 bombers in Okinawa
[Ref. 32: p. 210].
The leadership function is performed by the Chief of
Staff, Air Force. The typical senior officers are mostly Air
Force Academy graduates, with at least Bachelor's degree in
either Engineering or Science, and graduate level degrees
(Masters mostly), either from civilian universities or the
National Defense College.
By the mid-1970s the leadership has been increasingly
depending upon the new generation officers, the product of
the four-year Air Force Academy established in 1949. This
career officer corps is a homogeneous, highly motivated, and
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achievement-oriented group, the elite product of a careful
selection system and an appropriate education. They
represented in their rise to senior positions the development
of professionalism and stability within the military. A
strong sense of loyalty to the country and professional
elitism engendered by the four-year academy education
uniquely characterizes the academy graduates apart from the
officers of other sources [Ref. 28].
They are playing a very important role under the
situation that many of non-academy graduates are prone to
leaving the services shortly after completion of their
obligatory tour of duty. Main concerns of these academy
officers are to improve readiness, achieve higher
effectiveness, and to make the best usage of their human,
financial and material resources. It is in this context that
the question arises: Could the OD approach help the Korea Air
Force increase its effectiveness?
C. EFFORTS FOR INCREASING ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN THE KOREA AIR
FORCE
In the early 1970s major upgrading of the Korea Air Force
was being achieved under the five-year modernization program,
including the addition of a fighter-bomber squadron, the
acquisition of aircraft for anti-infiltration work, and
replacement of fighter-bombers with new short-range models.
An estimated 250 individual steel-and-concrete shelters
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capable of withstanding anything but a direct hit from a 750-
pound bomb had been completed as of 1972.
Even full achievement of the goals of the modernization
plan for the Air Force did not envisage a force capable of
taking over from United States forces the mission of air
deterrence [Ref. 28: pp. 355-356].
While the nation was fostering its defense industry to a
stage at which mass-production of all arms and munitions
(excepting nuclear weapons and fighter aircraft) became a
reality, the Korea Air Force itself exerted all its efforts
to increase its effectiveness.
Pilsung-Undong (Sure Victory Movement), for example, is
aimed at enhancing the morale, thus contributing to increased
combat effectiveness. Pilsung-Undong was first begun in the
Korea Air Force as an Air Force version of the nation-wide
Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement), which later inspired
the other branches of the service to establish their own
programs. Pilsung-Undong takes 40-50 students at a time from
all over the Air Force units to remind Air Force personnel of
Korea's positive side of the history, to encourage the
practice of industrious daily habits, and to recognize their
historical situation and responsibilities. This, in turn,
results in better awareness of their duty, better motivation
in personnel, and ultimately a contribution to increasing the
effectiveness of the Korea Air Force [Ref. 33].
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Tactics Development Wing was established several years
ago utilizing highly skilled pilots who participated in the
U.S. Red Flag Training Program, one of the world's most
intensive and realistic combat training. The wing set up a
program resembling that of the U.S. Red Flag and let the
pilots experience realistic combat situations.
Meanwhile, the Korea Air Force has been sending more
officers than ever before to various Allied countries to
learn and compare each country's program.
D. FACTORS HELPING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE KOREA AIR
FORCE
There are several positive factors that encourage the
introduction of OD, namely:
(1) Environmental climate
(2) Budget constraint
(3) The size of the Korea Air Force
(4) Cultural factor
Each of these will be explained as follows:
(1) Environmental climate : The nation-wide Saemaul-
Undong and inside-the-Air Force Pilsung-Undong both are aimed
at increasing the effectiveness of the organization. Also
President Chun has made it clear on several occasions that he
will try to establish a just democratic welfare society




(2) Budget constraint : The national budget for FY 83 has
about $ 700 million deficit for the first time in its history
[Ref. 35]. This will force higher productivity, or at least
maintaining the present rate, while inputs are held constant
or perhaps lowered. This situation alone creates a fertile
ground for the OD approach.
(3) The size of the Korea Ai r Force ; As it is the
smallest component of the Korea Armed Forces, it consumes
less material and utilizes less manpower than other services.
Also, it has less complicated chains of command and less
complex communication channels.
9
(4) Cultural factors : It has already been mentioned in
the previous section that the Korean father has absolute
power over his family, and his members are willing to follow
him no matter what difficulties they may expect. This
relationship is easily transferred to the work place. Once
the top management commitment is made, it is more likely to
be supported than in any other country.
E. FACTORS IMPEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE KOREA AIR
FORCE
There are some negative factors that go against the
introduction of OD, namely:






Each of these is explained as follows:
(1) No support from the top ; It seems that OD is not
introduced in Korea, at least in Armed Forces. As no program
has been proposed there has been no reaction from the top
either. At the present time, it is hard to tell what the
reaction will be.
(2) Cultural restraints : As mentioned in the previous
section, due to the Confucian influence Koreans put a lot of
emphasis on keeping proper relationships with each other.
This, in turn, resulted in the efforts of saving the face of
others, maintaining harmony among groups, being modest to
others, not insisting on one's opinion and being willing to
withdraw it whenever it becomes neccessary to maintain the
mood of cooperation. It also resulted in trying to be aware
of what others do and/or want to do, trying not to go against
one's seniors, and obeying orders.
All these efforts may not be favorable for OD activities
that encourage such values as power sharing, decentralization
of decision making, and openness and trust.
(3) Organizational structure : Even though the Korea Air
Force is the smallest component of the Armed Forces, it still
must coordinate activities and efforts, and assure
interaction and communication between numerous complex and
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diverse elements in order to accomplish its mission. To
.achieve this, the Air Force possesses an organization
structured as a hierarchical bureaucracy. The chain of
command is fully delineated and its employment is emphasized
in a very typical pyramidal structure.
(4) Budget and resources limit ; The Minister of Defense
revealed to congressmen a plan to reorganize the military
organiztion that will result in the savings of $120 million
in five years [Ref. 36]. With this plan, the introduction of
a wide spread OD effort could be severely limited by resource
constraints.
An attempt to allocate the funds for OD will require the
commitment of several key senior leaders willing to engage in
a congressional fight and to counter-argue whatever
objections the other services might bring up regarding the
use of these resources. This approach will be successful
only if enough high ranking officials could be sincerely
convinced and willing to commit themselves to a long-term




The authors conclude that there are potentials for
introducing OD in the Korea Air Force. Even though there is
no awareness of OD, there is a nation-wide felt need and
enthusiasm to improve effectiveness and efficiency and to
change attitudes of its personnel. This is evidenced by the
frequent appearance in the paper of such words as the Social
Purification Movement, upgrading of administrative
environment, civic awareness reformation, and establishment
of social order.
The Korea Air Force itself is inferior in number to that
of the North, and has far fewer fighters than the North. Its
leaders are a group of homogeneous professionals concerned
more about Air Force than themselves. They have been trying
to update and improve the effectiveness of the Korea Air
Force by employing such activities as Pilsung-Undong (Sure
Victory Movement), realistic combat training, and sending
more officers abroad to study.
Cultural restraints such as the Koreans' efforts to save
the face of others, maintain harmony among groups, be modest
to others, not insist on one's opinion and be willing to
withdraw it whenever it becomes necessary, try to be aware of
what others do and/or want to do, try not to go against
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seniors, and obey orders can be overcome only if top managers
can be persuaded of OD's successes and commit themselves to
applying it.
Considering the widespread usage of OD in the U.S.
military in spite of the general perception that military is
the epitome of an authoritarian, mechanistic, and
bureaucratic organization, the organizational structure of
the Korea Air Force can not be a critically impeding factor,
if it is a factor at all.
But, any attempt to immediately engage in OD in the Korea
Air Force, as it is typically practiced in the United States
will be doomed to failure. It goes without saying that a
careful modification process should take place. Even if the
modification process is followed, there is still a big effort
required to achieve a cultural preparedness of the
organization. OD efforts, as generally practiced in the
Western culture encourage open discussions of conflict, and
actively strive towards collaborative management. This might
not comply with the Korean style of life.
The authors also believe that even though "textbook OD"
could not be applied directly to the Korea Air Force, it can
be beneficial for those who really want to improve their
personal leadership and management capabilities. That's
because if one is aw ire of the nature and limit of
subordinates' consensus or obedience, and he is eager to
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improve his true leadership, he might be able to get a lot of
assistance from using certain techniques of OD.
This implied benefit indicates a need for the
organization to train and prepare individuals in Organization
Development, as well as for including formal courses of
Behavioral Science, Leadership, and Organization Theory in
the Curricula at the Air Force Academy, and to expand those
at the Air Force College. Assigning some of the officers who
come to the U.S. to study for a master's degree to specialize
in OD might also be good. If this proposed scheme is
followed, the organization will have developed in a period of
four or five years so that enough human resources are
knowlegeable in conducting OD efforts. If any attempt is to
be made, however, it must be made on a gradual basis.
The authors advocate the gradual involvement in OD for
the following reasons:
(1) It allows the time for people to learn how to do it.
The Korea Air Force can get more human resources qualified in
OD by sending people to school and letting them study OD and
other related fields. This will build up necessary
professional skills.
(2) Development of techniques and approaches appli-
cable to Korea takes time. As mentioned already, the
textbook OD of Western cultures can not be applied directly
to Korea. Instead, a more gradual approach would cause less
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pressure on people to develop OD before it was really thought
through. A slower process of developing techniques and
testing them would be appropriate.
(3) Cultural change is already under way within Korea.
This change is more toward the Western than the traditional
Korean culture. Emphasis on strict protocal, for example, is
shifting toward more stress on effectiveness. The new
generation of officers who think more about professionalism
tend to value getting the job done effectively rather than
clinging to the traditional values of the culture. In five
years those people who are majors and colonels will make
colonel and general. They will be more willing to listen to
the proposals to improve the organizational effectiveness.
(4) It allows the time to integrate OD with Korean
behavioral science and culture. As Western OD is based on
Western psychology, sociology, and research, Korean OD should
be based on Korean needs, values, expectations and its own
study. Then Korea will be able to invent its own approaches
and techniques suitable to itself. This may benefit the West
as well.
A gradual approach will, authors believe, make OD more
compatible with Korean culture and help improve the
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